

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	13
Part I: Preliminaries	15
Chapter 1: Analyzing sectoral climate policy ambition in the european union	17
1.1 A political response to climate change.....	17
1.1.1 Outline of the book	19
1.1.2 The importance of ambitious EU climate policy.....	20
1.2 Climate change as a political problem	22
1.3 A brief history of the politics of climate change	25
1.3.1 The development of a global climate regime	25
1.3.2 The EU's involvement in climate policy.....	30
1.4 The literature on climate change politics and policy	33
1.4.1 The literature on EU climate politics and policy.....	34
1.4.2 The literature on the domestic politics of climate change.....	38
1.5 Conclusion	40
Part II: Theory And Methodology	43
Chapter 2: Interests and arguments – explaining sectoral climate policy ambition in the EU	45
2.1 Introduction.....	45
2.2 The rational choice baseline.....	47
2.2.1 Rational Choice Approaches to EU and environmental policy-making	48
2.2.2 Basic features of the rational choice baseline	50
2.2.3 The European Commission – Engine of European Integration and Climate Policy.....	53
2.2.4 The European Parliament – A Green Actor Driving Climate Policy	55
2.2.5 The Council – Member State Governments Defending their Industries and Administrations	58

2.2.6 Bargaining about climate policy ambition	61
2.2.7 Overall implications and limitations of the rational choice baseline	64
2.3 The analysis of rhetorical possibilities	65
2.3.1 Making arguments Work – analyzing rhetorical possibilities....	66
2.3.2 Arguing about sectoral climate policies – a stylized conversation	69
2.3.3 The conditions for rhetorical entrapment	73
2.4 Conclusion – a simple and coherent explanatory framework.....	77
 Chapter 3: Analyzing Eu Climate Politics – Research Design and Data Requirements	79
3.1 Introduction.....	79
3.2 The concept of “Sectoral Climate Policy Ambition”	79
3.2.1 Measuring sectoral climate policy ambition	80
3.2.2 Addressing potential criticisms of the measurement scheme....	87
3.3 Research design – climate policy in five sectors.....	89
3.3.1 Justification of Case Selection	89
3.3.2 Approach to Case Analysis	92
3.4 Operationalization of independent variables.....	94
3.4.1 Measuring National Interest Group Constellations	94
3.4.2 Measuring the restrictiveness of the discursive environment....	95
3.4.2.1 General Policy Environment	95
3.4.2.2 Climate Policy Environment	99
3.4.2.3 Sectoral Policy Environment.....	99
3.5 Alternative explanatory factors	100
3.5.1 Transnational non-governmental actors	100
3.5.2 Party Politics in the European Parliament and the member states.....	101
3.5.3 General leader-laggard-dynamics	104
3.5.4 Package deals and case-specific factors	105
3.6 Conclusion	105
 Part III: – Empirical Observations – Five Cases of EU Sectoral Climate Policy-Making	107
 Chapter 4: Reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars – climate policy by rhetorical entrapment	109
4.1 Introduction.....	109
4.2 Making cars less thirsty – EU policies to reduce CO2 emissions from cars	110

4.2.1 A strategy for CO2 emissions from cars emerges	112
4.2.2 The Agreement with ACEA.....	113
4.2.3 Failure to meet the targets – movement towards binding rules.....	115
4.2.4 The regulation to limit passenger car CO2 emissions	117
4.3 Explaining EU Policies on CO2 emissions from passenger cars – the rational choice baseline	119
4.3.1 Theoretical Predictions	120
4.3.1.1 Predictions for the 1990s	122
4.3.2 Empirical Evidence on the Rational Choice Baseline.....	126
4.3.2.1 Evidence from the Negotiation of the Voluntary Agreement	126
4.3.2.2 Empirical evidence from the Negotiation of Regulation No. 443/2009.....	132
4.4 Explaining EU policies on CO2 emissions from cars – the analysis of rhetorical possibilities	140
4.4.1 The discursive environment in the mid-1990s	140
4.4.2 The discursive environment in 2007/2008	143
4.5 Alternative explanatory factors	149
4.5.1 Transnational non-governmental actors	149
4.5.2 Party Politics in the European Parliament and in the member states.....	152
4.5.3 General leader-laggard dynamics.....	156
4.5.4 Package Deals	156
4.6 Conclusion	157
Chapter 5: The european emissions trading scheme – the best option under rhetorical constraints.....	159
5.1 Introduction.....	159
5.2 The establishment of emissions trading – getting to high policy ambition	161
5.2.1 From Kyoto to Brussels – the emergence of emissions trading	161
5.2.2 Directive 2003/87/EC – An ambitious policy to address EU emissions.....	163
5.3 Explaining the emergence of the EU ETS – the rational choice baseline	167
5.3.1 Rational Choice Baseline Predictions on Emissions Trading ..	167
5.3.1.1 Interests of the Electricity Sector.....	168
5.3.1.2 Interests of manufacturing industries.....	171

5.3.1.3 Predictions on Member State Preferences and Bargaining Outcomes on the EU ETS	175
5.3.2 Empirical evidence on the rational choice baseline	177
5.3.2.1 European Commission Preferences	178
5.3.2.2 European Parliament Preferences	179
5.3.2.3 Member State Preferences	180
5.3.2.4 The Bargaining Outcome.....	189
5.4 Explaining the emergence of the EU ETS – the analysis of rhetorical possibilities	190
5.4.1 Description of the discursive environment in 2001-2003	191
5.4.2 Evidence on the relevance of the Discursive Environment.....	196
5.4.3 Kyoto's relevance to other policies?	198
5.5 Alternative explanatory factors	200
5.5.1 Transnational non-governmental actors	200
5.5.2 Party Politics in the European Parliament and in the member states.....	203
5.5.3 General Leader-Laggard Dynamics	204
5.5.4 Package Deals	205
5.6 Conclusion	205
 Chapter 6: Promoting the energy efficiency of buildings – overcoming concerns about adaptation costs	207
6.1 Introduction.....	207
6.2 Developing an EU building energy efficiency policy – a gradual increase in policy ambition	208
6.2.1 The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive – a low ambition policy	210
6.2.2 Moving towards greater policy ambition – the EPBD recast 2008/2009	212
6.3 Explaining EU building energy efficiency policy – the rational choice baseline	215
6.3.1 Rational Choice Baseline Predictions	216
6.3.1.1 Affected Interest Groups	216
6.3.1.2 Measuring Administrative Adaptation Costs.....	221
6.3.2 Empirical evidence on the rational choice baseline	225
6.3.2.1 Evidence from negotiations about the original EPBD.....	226
6.3.2.2 Evidence from the Negotiation of the EPBD Recast..	231
6.4 Explaining EU building energy efficiency policy – the analysis of rhetorical possibilities	242

6.4.1	The discursive environment in 2001/2002	242
6.4.2	The discursive environment in 2008/2009	245
6.5	Alternative explanatory factors	253
6.5.1	Transnational non-governmental actors	253
6.5.2	Party politics in the European Parliament and the member states.....	256
6.5.3	General Leader-Laggard Dynamics, Package Deals, and Other Factors	257
6.6	Conclusion	258

Chapter 7:	Promoting renewable energy – the creation of favorable interest group constellations.....	261
7.1	introduction	261
7.2	Developing an EU policy to support renewable energy – from low to medium ambition	262
7.2.1	Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources – The slow adoption of a low ambition policy	266
7.2.2	Towards greater policy ambition –Developing and Negotiating an integrated Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC).....	269
7.3	Explaining EU renewable energy policy – the rational choice baseline	274
7.3.1	Rational Choice Baseline Predictions for Renewable Energy Policy	274
7.3.2	Empirical Evidence on the Rational Choice Baseline.....	287
7.3.2.1	The negotiation of Directive 2001/77/EC.....	288
7.3.2.2	Empirical Evidence from the negotiations of the Renewables Directive.....	293
7.4	Explaining EU renewable energy policy – the analysis of rhetorical possibilities	303
7.4.1	The discursive environment in 2000/2001	304
7.4.2	The discursive environment in 2007/2008	306
7.5	Alternative explanatory factors	309
7.5.1	Transnational interest group constellations.....	310
7.5.2	Party politics in the European Parliament and in the member states.....	311
7.5.3	General leader-laggard Dynamics	314
7.5.4	Package deals and other factors	315
7.6	Conclusion	316

Chapter 8: Limiting agricultural ghg emissions in the Eu – a successful non-policy	319
8.1 Introduction.....	319
8.2 Agriculture and climate policy in the EU.....	320
8.2.1 CAP Reforms and agricultural GHG emissions.....	322
8.2.2 EU efforts to address agricultural GHG emissions	325
8.3 Explaining the absence of climate policy for the agricultural sector – the rational choice baseline.....	329
8.3.1 Rational choice baseline predictions and evidence on European Commission preferences.....	329
8.3.2 Rational Choice Baseline Predictions and Evidence on European Parliament Preferences	330
8.3.3 Rational choice baseline predictions and evidence on member state preferences.....	332
8.4 Explaining the absence of climate policy for the agricultural sector – the analysis of rhetorical possibilities.....	338
8.5 Conclusion	340
Part IV: Comparisons and implications.....	343
Chapter 9: Comparisons and conclusions – what we have learned, what it means	345
9.1 Introduction.....	345
9.2 Interests matter – evidence on the rational choice baseline.....	346
9.2.1 European Commission Preferences.....	346
9.2.2 European Parliament Preferences	349
9.2.3 Member State Preferences	351
9.2.4 Bargaining Outcomes.....	354
9.3 Arguments matter more, sometimes – evidence on the discursive environment’s impact on policy ambition.....	357
9.4 Conclusions – implications for future research and for the “real world”	361
Appendices	367
Appendix I: Climate policy ambition level of EU policies	369
Appendix II: List of interviewees	379
CO2 emissions from passenger cars	379
Emissions Trading	380
Energy Performance of Buildings	380

Renewable Energy Promotion.....	381
Agriculture.....	382
Appendix III: List of abbreviations.....	383
Appendix IV: List of tables.....	387
Appendix V: List of figures	391
Bibliography	393
Secondary Literature.....	393
EU Documents Cited	426
Government Documents Cited.....	436
Lobby and environmental NGO Documents Cited	442
Media Articles Cited	451