Contents

Abbreviations and Glossary			15
INTRODUCTION			19
THE	ORETICAL PA	ART	35
I.	What's so spe	cial about	
		onships'?- the hunt for an elusive concept	35
II.		tives on the concept - the 'evangelists'	40
III.		llist perspective - Reynold's approach	42
IV.	Critique of Re	eynold's approach	46
V.	(Dys-)Function	onalist and	
		ctivist approaches - and their weaknesses	47
VI.		adigms - Ben-Zvi's approach	49
VII.		en-Zvi's approach	51
		elationship framework - Gardner Feldman's approach	54
IX.	Critique of Ga	ardner Feldman's approach	61
X.		and prioritising - Danchev's approach	62
XI.		anchev's approach	64
XII.	Towards a the	coretical and methodological synthesis	69
ANA	LYTICAL PA	RT	79
I.	Security coop	peration	79
		nce cooperation	81
	I.1.1.	Information exchange on terrorism	83
		I.1.1.1. The case of Steven Smyrek	84
		I.1.1.2. The ban on the Al-Aqsa charity	86
		I.1.1.3. Al-Qaeda	88
		I.1.1.4. 'Iran Kolahdooz'	89
	I.1.2.	German intelligence as mediator	90
		I.1.2.1. Humanitarian exchanges	90
		I.1.2.2. The 'Mykonos trial'	101
	I.1.3.	Counter-proliferation activities	108
		I.1.3.1. Monitoring of rogue states	108
		I.1.3.2. 'Waalhaven'	112
		I.1.3.3. 'Zim Antwerp'	114
	1.1.4.		115
	I.1.5.	Öcalan's capture	115
	I.1.6.	Technical cooperation	116

	I.1.7. Military intelligence contacts	117
	I.1.8. Mutual monitoring and	
	strains on intelligence relations	121
	I.1.9. German intelligence cooperation with Arab states	123
	I.1.10. Overall picture of intelligence cooperation	125
I.2.	Police cooperation	129
I.3.		136
	I.3.1. Government-to-government cooperation and aid	136
	I.3.1.1. Contractual formalisation	136
	I.3.1.2. The CERBERUS/TSPJ programme	138
	I.3.1.3. Gulf War aid	151
	I.3.1.4. The DOLPHIN project	155
	1.3.1.5. Arms technical cooperation	169
	I.3.1.6. Arms embargo?	186
	I.3.1.7. Arms aid during the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis	192
	I.3.1.8. The 'FUCHS vehicles'	195
	I.3.1.9. The ARROW	198
	I.3.2. Commercial arms procurement	
	and industry-to-industry cooperation	199
	I.3.2.1. Electronic self-protection	
	measures for air vehicles	200
	I.3.2.2. The LITENING system	202
	1.3.2.3. The EHUD system	204
	I.3.2.4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)	205
	1.3.2.5. Grob trainer aircraft	206
	I.3.2.6. Supercomputer	206
	I.3.2.7. Air-to-ground missiles	207
	I.3.2.8. Satellite and space technology	208
	I.3.2.9. SPIKE	210
	I.3.2.10. Firearms for special forces	213
	I.3.2.11. Ammunition	213
	I.3.2.12. Tanks and armour	214
	I.3.2.13. Motors for naval vessels	210
	I.3.2.14. Torpedoes	21
	I.3.2.15. Joint upgradings for third parties	21
	I.3.2.16. Commercial take-overs	219
	I.3.3. German arms sales to Arab states and to Iran	22
	I.3.4. Cooperation between the armed forces	224
	I.3.4.1. Mutual visits between decision-makers	224
	1.3.4.2. Joint training and	
	exchange of experience	22
	I.3.4.2.1. The Armies	228

I.3.4.2.2. The Air Forces	230
I.3.4.2.3. The Navies	231
I.3.4.2.4. Further fields of exchar	nge 232
I.3.4.2.5. The Kommando	_
Spezialkräfte (KSK)	233
I.3.4.3. Military training with Arab states	236
I.3.4.4. Personal relations	
between the security communities	237
I.3.5. Overall picture of military cooperation	240
I.4. Conclusion	243
II. Political relations	249
II.1. German Reunification	250
II.2. The 1991 Gulf War	258
II.3. Institutions, mutual political visits and contacts	263
II.3.1. Institutions	263
II.3.2. Mutual visits	265
II.3.3. Personal relations, mutual honours,	
and honorary commitments	267
II.3.4. Parliamentary contacts	269
II.3.5. Political foundations and parties	272
II.3.6. Israel as a constitutive	
symbol in German domestic politics	275
II.4. Support in international bodies	
II.4.1. European Union	275
II.4.1.1. The Association Agreement	275
II.4.1.2. Prevention of sanctions	279
II.4.1.3. Ban on the Hamas	283
II.4.2. United Nations	284
II.4.2.1. Voting behaviour in UN bodies	284
II.4.2.2. Western European	
and Others Group (WEOG)	287
II.4.2.3. The Durban Conference	288
II.4.2.4. The Geneva Convention	291
II.4.2.5. Israeli support for Germany	291
II.5. The Federal Republic in the Middle East	292
II.5.1. Germany's relations with Iran	292
II.5.2. Germany's relations with the Palestinians	296
II.5.3. Political mediation	298
II.5.4. Humanitarian help	302
II.5.5. Germany's reticence in its criticism of Israel	304
II.5.6. Germany's gradual distancing from Arafat	308

	II.5.7. Misuse of funds by the Palestinian Authority	311
	II.5.8. The 2003 Iraq War	313
	II.5.9. The political climate in Germany	
	in the face of the Second Intifada	315
	II.5.10. The concept of sending	
	German soldiers to the Middle East	322
	II.6. Compensation for forced labour	326 329
	II.7. The storming of the Israeli Consulate General II.8. Strains on relations	
	II.8.1. Reservations about Reunification	331
	II.8.2. Immigration of Soviet Jews	332 333
	II.8.3. Neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism II.8.4. Various faux pas with regard to Kinkel II.8.5. German contacts with Iran	
	II.8.6. Netanyahu's policies	337 338
	II.8.7. East Jerusalem	
	II.9. Public opinion and the media	340
	II.9.1. Germany	343
	II.9.1.1. Public opinion	343
	II.9.1.2. Media reporting	350
	II.9.1.3. Demonstrations	355
	II.9.2. Israel	356
	II.9.2.1. Public opinion	356
	II.9.2.2. Media reporting	360
	II.9.2.3. German citizenship	361
	II.10. Conclusion	362
III.	Economic and Financial relations	369
	III.1. Grants and loans	370
	III.1.1.Restitution on behalf of the former GDR	370
	III.1.2.German aid during the 1991 Gulf War	372
	III.1.3.German development aid to Israel	372
	III.1.4.German aid to regional	
	projects and to the Palestinians	376
	III.2. Payments to individuals in Israel	380
	III.3. Trade and investment promotion	382
	III.3.1.Treaties and memoranda III.3.2.The Anti-Boycott Decree III.3.3.Export guarantees	
	III.3.4.The Mixed Commission	388
	III.3.5.The Israel Trade Center	389

III.3.6.The Israeli-German	
Chamber of Commerce and Industry	389
III.3.7. The German-Israeli Council for Co-operation	
in High-Tech and Environmental Technology	
(DIKHUT)	390
III.3.8. The German-Israeli Economic Association	39
III.3.9.High-ranking visits	391
III.4. Trade and investments	392
III.4.1.Trade	392
III.4.2.Investments	396
III.5. The Association Agreement with the EU	399
III.6. Conclusion	402
IV. Scientific, social, professional and cultural contacts	405
IV.1. Science and Technology	405
IV.1.1. Government-to-government science promotion	407
IV.1.1.1. The Minerva Foundation	407
IV.1.1.2. The Direct Cooperation between the	•
Ministries of Science	409
IV.1.1.3. The German Israeli Foundation (GI	F) 411
IV.1.1.4. The German-Israeli	
Project Cooperation (DIP)	414
IV.1.1.5. The German-Israeli Industrial	
R&D Cooperation (DIIK)	415
IV.1.2. Non-government-to-government	
science promotion	416
IV.1.2.1. The <i>Länder</i> and the universities	416
IV.1.2.2. The Alexander von	
Humboldt Foundation (AvH)	420
IV.1.2.3. The German Research	
Foundation (DFG)	421
IV.1.2.4. Other non-profit organisations	422
IV.1.3. EU framework programmes	422
IV.1.4. Personal aspects	424
IV.1.5. Overall picture	
of the science and technology cooperation	425
IV.2. Youth exchange	429
IV.3. Social work	436
IV.4. City twinnings	438
IV.5. The Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB)	441
IV.6. Contacts between Labour Unions	446
IV.7. Cultural relations and cooperation in education	452

IV.8. Sports	462
IV.9. Tourism	463
IV.10.The political foundations	464
IV.11.The Bertelsmann Foundation	465
IV.12.Associations and Societies	468
IV.12.1.The German-Israeli Society (DIG)	
and the Israeli-German Society (IDG)	468
IV.12.2.The German-Israeli and the Israeli-German	
Associations of Lawyers	469
IV.12.3.The Jerusalem Foundation	471
IV.12.4.Other associations	472
IV.13.Conclusion	473
CONCLUSION	477
Sources	491